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Abstract
Leibniz coined the word “dynamics,” but his own dynamics has never been 
completed. However, there are many illuminating ideas scattered in his writings on 
dynamics and metaphysics. In this paper, I will present my own interpretation of 
Leibniz’s dynamics and metaphysics (which is indispensable for any reasonable 
reconstruction of Leibniz’s dynamics). To my own surprise, Leibniz’s dynamics and 
metaphysics are incredibly flexible and modern. In particular, (a) the metaphysical 
part, namely Monadology, can be interpreted as a theory of information in terms of 
monads, which generate both physical phenomena and mental phenomena. (b) The 
phenomena, i.e., how the world of monads appears to each monad must be distinguished 
from its internal states, which Leibniz calls perceptions, and the phenomena must be 
understood as the results of these states and God’s coding. My distinctive claim is that 
most interpreters ignored this coding. (c) His dynamics and metaphysics can 
provide a framework good enough for enabling Einstein’s special relativity (but of 
course Leibniz did not know that). And finally, (d) his dynamics and metaphysics 
can provide a very interesting theory of space and time. 
In Part 1, we will focus on the relationship between metaphysics and dynamics. 
Leibniz often says that dynamics is subordinated to metaphysics. We have to take 
this statement seriously, and we have to investigate how dynamics and metaphysics 
are related. To this question, I will give my own answer, based on my informational 
interpretation. 
On my view, Leibniz’s metaphysics tries, among others, to clarify the following 
three: (1) How each monad is programmed. (2) How monads are organized into 
many groups, each of which is governed by a dominant monad (entelechy); this can 
be regarded as a precursor of von Neumann’s idea of cellular automata. And (3) how 
the same structure is repeated in sub-layers of the organization. This structure is 
best understood in terms of the hierarchy of programs, a nested structure going 
down from the single dominant program (corresponding to entelechy) to 
subprograms, which again controls respective subprograms, and ad infinitum. If we 
1
may use a modern term, this is a sort of recursion, although Leibniz himself did not 
know this word. 
And one of my major discoveries is that the same recursive structure is repeated in 
the phenomenal world, the domain of dynamical investigations. Recursion of what, 
you may ask. I will argue that it is elastic collision. For Leibniz, aside from inertial 
motions, dynamical changes of motion are brought about by elastic collisions, at 
any level of the infinite divisibility of matter. This nicely corresponds to the 
recursive structure of the program of a monad, or of the program of an organized 
group of monads. This is the crux of his claim that dynamics is subordinated to 
metaphysics. Moreover, the program of any monad is teleological, whereas the 
phenomenal world is governed by efficient cause of dynamics. And it is natural that 
the pre-established harmony is there, since God is the ultimate programmer, as well 
as the creator.
* * * * *
1. Preliminaries
Let me remind the reader of my previous paper on Leibniz (Uchii 2009). In that 
paper, I presented an outline of Leibniz’s Monadology as a theory of information: (1) 
each monad can be regarded as an incorporeal automaton (infinite-state machine) 
programmed by God; (2) each monad has its own state-transition function 
governing the whole series of its change; and (3) the phenomena which appear to 
each monad are the result of its internal states and the coding God has prepared. I 
will explain each item in more detail.
(1)  Leibniz’s informational turn
Beginning with Discourse on Metaphysics (1686), Leibniz developed his 
philosophical view, via New System of Nature (1695), to Monadology (1714). Initially, 
he concentrated on the notion of individual substance, depending on the traditional 
logic of “subject and predicate,” thus claiming that the subject of an individual 
contains all predicates applicable to that individual in the actual world. However, 
soon he realized (during the correspondence with Arnauld) that “this complete 
individual notion involves relations to the whole series of things” (Ariew and 
Garber 1989, 69). And, as I see, he came to the following view in New System of 
Nature:
! For why should God be unable to give substance, from the beginning, a 
! nature or an internal force that can produce in it, in an orderly way (as would 
! happen in a spiritual or formal automaton, but free in the case where it has a 
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! share of reason), everything that will happen to it, that is, all the 
! appearances or expressions it will have, without the help of any created 
! being? (sect. 15)
Here, instead of the old-fashioned “subject-predicate form,” Leibniz introduced the 
crucial concepts of “spiritual automaton” and its “transition function” (this is the 
modern term in information theory, corresponding to the ”internal force” in the 
preceding quotation) which governs the change of its internal state. The word 
“formal” is related with the Aristotelian “form,” the essential element responsible 
for the unity of substance. By means of these concepts, Leibniz could overcome the 
constraints of the “subject-predicate form,” and handle the relations of internal 
states and even the relations among the individuals. But note that “relation” is 
always ideal, not real, according to Leibniz. Each monad is self-sufficient, and strictly 
there are no communications (hence no relations) between any two monads. 
However, Leibniz often allows an ideal mode of speech, so to speak, by saying that a 
monad is active or passive to another. Later I will clarify this point (from Section 9).
Further, the transition function of each monad can be interpreted as a teleological 
law, since God created and programmed each for attaining a certain goal. Even a 
program made by a human programmer is teleological, since it is a program for 
doing a certain job.
(2)  Whole series of change given at once
Each individual substance is later called “monad.” And what is crucial here is the 
following: (i) Monads have no extension, and hence no need for space. (ii) God gave 
the whole series of change for each monad at once, when He created the world, and 
hence no need for time! In the realm of substances or monads, there are neither space 
nor time, so that whatever is real is given without space, and atemporally or eternally! 
That’s one of the reasons why God could establish harmony among the created 
monads. And that’s also one of the reasons why Leibniz continually says that space 
and time are both ideal, space and time are only for phenomena, not any part of 
reality. Then you may wonder: how do space and time arise from the atemporal 
reality without extension? Thus we now come to point (3).
(3)  Phenomena, space, and time
In his later Monadology, Leibniz characterizes changes of monad (substance)
in terms of perceptions and appetitions (appetites). “The passing state which involves 
and represents a multitude in the unity is nothing other than what one calls 
perception” (Monadology, sect. 14, Ariew and Garber 1989, 214). And, the “action of 
the internal principle which brings about the change or passage from one 
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perception to another can be called appetition” (op.cit., 215). The “internal principle” 
is nothing but what I called “transition function,” and its “instantaneous action” is 
appetition. 
But, here, we have to be very careful. Leibniz’s “perception” is different from 
ordinary perception in our consciousness; it’s a technical word for expressing a 
“passing state” of monad. Further, we have to keep in mind that perceptions occur 
in monads which exist in timeless realm! Thus our ordinary perceptions in our 
consciousness and in time must be sharply distinguished from the Leibnizian 
technical perception.
This distinction leads us to the question of the relationship between the reality and 
the phenomena. The reality is without space and without time, but the phenomena 
occur in space and time. To be more specific, physical phenomena (motion, in 
particular) take place within space and time, and mental phenomena (sensations, 
feelings, etc.) occur in time, at least. Moreover, it makes good sense to say that 
mental phenomena, such as sensations or thinking, need spatial concepts for their 
description. When I say “I feel a stab of pain in my head,” my head of course has a 
spatiotemporal location! When I say “I think, therefore I am,” my thinking occurs in 
some location. Leibniz himself points this out to de Volder (20 June 1703, Ariew and 
Garber 1989, 178). 
Then we definitely need something bridging these two different realms. I claimed, in 
my previous paper, that God must have used coding, from reality to phenomena 
(how reality appears to humans, for instance,  or to any other creatures); reality is 
encoded, and we humans have to decode in order to know any part of reality. 
In addition to the fact that space and time exist only in the phenomenal world, take 
Leibniz’s famous claim of infinite divisibility of matter. A collection of monads exists 
behind any phenomenal body with a spatiotemporal location; and this 
correspondence becomes unintelligible without some coding, bridging reality and 
phenomena, two entirely different realms. For, monads are ultimate atoms, not 
divisible at all! Thus you may see one of the essential points of my informational 
interpretation. In the realm of monads, there are no quantitative properties, only 
qualitative properties. The quantities in the phenomenal world are added, so to 
speak, by coding, when God encoded the realm of monads to the phenomena. 
Perceptions of a monad do have real basis, since they represent what is going on in 
all monads. But when we humans (or any other monads) see phenomena, we see 
many (qualitative) features of monads in a disguised form, containing quantities also. 
This clearly shows that we have to recognize the presence of coding, God’s coding 
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(no one else can provide it!). Representation is not simple mirroring, but can have 
various forms, as long as it can secure a certain correspondence. That’s what coding can 
accomplish.
Needless to say, the modern reader should immediately understand the need for 
coding for programming. For Leibniz, God is the ultimate programmer, creating 
monads, determining what they do, and what their activities appear to each other! 
The last cannot be identified with perceptions (states) of a monad. To repeat, in order 
to express something by something else, you’ve got to adopt some coding, and 
(rational) God is no exception!
Since this point is crucial for my informational interpretation, let me illustrate it in 
terms of a simple symbolism. Let us consider only two monads, monad-1 and 
monad-2. The first has its own sequence of states (perceptions) s1 and the second has 
s2. Notice that these two sequences are not only different but incompatible (within 
the same monad), because of Leibniz’s principle of identity of indiscernibles (monads 
are differentiated only by their states). And when monad-1 appears to monad-2, this 
appearance cannot be the same as s1. Thus this appearance must be something like 
E(s1), which is an encoded version of s1. Thus the sequence of states and the sequence 
of appearances have a different status, respectively, in any monad. Hence, we need 
decoding in order to obtain information of reality from phenomena. This illustration 
is no doubt oversimplified, but it can show the essential point. It should be noted 
that, although a monad’s perceptions (states) are themselves a representation, and 
hence they are encoded, the encoding for perceptions and that for phenomena must be 
different; the latter is doubly encoded, so to speak. That’s the point of my argument.
Now, as De Risi has convincingly argued, Leibniz assumed that there are at least 
homomorphisms (partial isomorphisms) between phenomena and essential features 
of reality (De Risi 2007, ch. 3). This is perfectly consonant with my own 
informational interpretation of Monadology. For, by expressing a feature of reality in 
terms of phenomena via some coding, the correspondence between the two realms 
can be perfectly preserved, although phenomena may contain something more as well, 
which does not exist in reality, e.g., space, time, and infinitely divisible matter.
As regards the nature of space and time, Leibniz repeatedly claimed that “space is 
an order of coexistences, time is an order of successions,” and they appear only in 
phenomena. This claim has to be reconstructed properly, and, consistently with any 
reconstruction of Leibniz’s dynamics. To the best of my knowledge, this task is still 
largely left to be done, and I wish to make a significant contribution in this field. 
And, for this task, my informational interpretation can provide a useful framework. 
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And even at this preliminary stage, it should be clear to the reader that space and 
time (in the phenomenal world) are the products of certain features of monads 
together with God’s coding!
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2. Leibniz on Forces
With this background, we can begin to discuss Leibniz’s dynamics. His mature 
views on mechanics and dynamics began to appear around 1686 (the famous 
criticism of the Cartesian physics). It may be instructive to inquire the reason why 
Leibniz came to the notion of force, in opposition to the Cartesian view that the 
essence of body is extension. For this purpose, his paper “On Body and Force, 
Against the Cartesians” (1702, included in Ariew and Garber 1989, 250-256) is quite 
instructive. Aside from Leibniz’s emphasis on the notion of living force (vis viva), 
rather than the Cartesian quantity of motion (momentum), he spells out another 
reason for insisting on the notion of force. 
According to Leibniz, Cartesians can explain neither the nature of body nor the 
nature of motive force. Our experience shows that physical bodies have two kinds of 
resistance, impenetrability and inertia. The former prevents, when one body collide 
with another, that one goes through the other; without this impenetrability, any 
collision and any change of motion would be impossible. Moreover, any change of 
motion by collision, the size (mass) of body is relevant, so that the degree of 
resistance against motion has to be considered. This is, in modern terms, inertia and 
inertial mass. And Leibniz argues nicely how we should combine these two 
properties with extension. He points out that extension “signifies a diffusion or 
repetition of a certain nature” (op.cit., 251). Body has extension just as abstract space 
has. And Leibniz further points out that “extension” is a relative term which 
depends on what is extended, or diffused or repeated. Spatial extension (length) 
depends, roughly speaking, on repeated use of unit length (rod), but the extension 
of a body depends on the preceding two properties, and this makes an essential 
difference from mere spatial extension!
However, resistance alone cannot begin any new motion. Thus Leibniz introduces 
dynamicon, or the innate principle of change and persistence (ibid.). You may suspect 
that dynamicon is twofold, in that change and persistence are mentioned. However, it 
may be rash to conclude so. Leibniz indeed say that dynamicon is twofold, active and 
passive; and these two corresponde to active force and passive force. But the 
relationship between “change/persistence” and “active/passive” is not 
straightforward, as we will see shortly. Anyway, the important point here is that in 
an extended body, these two kinds of force are inherent, and these two are repeated 
or diffused all over the same body.
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3. Specimen Dynamicum
The preceding is Leibniz’s own summary written much later (1702) than his paper 
on dynamics (1695). But this can help us considerably, and we can now proceed to 
Leibniz’s works on dynamics and related subjects. To mention only the most 
important works, (1) the famous claim of the conservation of force (energy, in 
modern terms), (2) works on planetary motion (1689-90), and (3) the manuscripts 
on dynamics (1691-95), of which only a part was published. For Leibniz’s earlier 
works on physics, the reader is referred to Garber’s excellent paper (1995), as well 
as the relevant parts (chh. 2 and 7) of Aiton (1985).
For convenience of exposition, let us begin with (3). The main text is Specimen 
Dynamicum (1695). This paper begins with a paragraph that contains the following 
striking statement:
! ... strictly speaking, motion (and likewise time) never really exists, since the 
! whole never exists, inasmuch as it lacks coexistent parts. And furthermore, 
! there is nothing real in motion but a momentary something which must 
! consist in a force striving [nitente] toward change. Whatever there is in 
! corporeal nature over and above the object of geometry or extension reduces 
! to this. (Ariew and Garber 1989, 118)
At first, the reader may wonder what this means. But remember what we saw in 
the preceding Section 1, Preliminaries (2) and (3). In the “strict sense,” time does 
not exist, because the reality is timeless. And, when one says an object x moves 
from place A to another place B, “x at A” and “x at B” cannot coexist, so that “the 
whole motion never exists”; this is what Leibniz is saying. Motion is a phenomenon 
we see in our conscious perception, not any part of reality. However, it has a basis 
in reality, and this basis can be called a “force striving toward change,” which 
somehow expresses a force in monads (real substances).
With this explanation, it may become easier to understand Leibniz’s classification of 
force into four categories.  As we saw in Section 1, (1), a monad is given “an internal 
force that can produce everything that will happen to it”; this force is called 
“primitive force.” However, the story is not that simple. For, in Specimen 
Dynamicum, this primitive force is divided into the active and the passive, and the 
reason for this will be explained shortly. Further, these forces must be reflected in 
phenomena, and therefore, there must be derivative forces, active and passive. 
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The need for this division is already suggested in Section 2, but we will go into 
more detail, on the basis of the text of Specimen Dynamicum. 
In physical phenomena, many thinkers assumed that the concept of inertia is 
indispensable. Thus Newton’s First Law is the law of inertia: By its innate force alone 
a body will always proceed uniformly in a straight line provided nothing hinders it. By this 
property of inertia, a body at rest remains at rest, unless something hinders this 
state. And Newton’s Second Law says that a force can change the state of rest, as well as 
the state of motion, and moreover, that the change is proportional to that force. Further, 
inertia works together with inertial mass, which is the measure of the resistance 
against the change of motion. In addition, the Second Law introduces acceleration, the 
rate of change of velocity when a force is impressed on a body; thus the Newtonian 
force can be expressed as the product of inertial mass and acceleration, F = ma. You 
may wonder how Leibniz would reconstruct this Newtonian mechanics, and that’s 
exactly the question we address in the following.
Now, Leibniz likewise admits inertia, but also impenetrability (antitypy) as essential 
properties of a body, as we have seen in Section 2; these are the main expressions of 
the derivative passive force. However, he is quite reluctant to admit the notion of 
acceleration; and here, we may encounter a big obstacle against understanding the 
Leibnizian dynamics. But before getting into this topic, we have to say what 
derivative active force is. This is a rather hard job, since it is hard to find Leibniz’s 
unambiguous and decisive texts on this issue, which, at the same time, looks reasonable 
to us, the modern readers. 
One may suspect that it may be what Leibniz calls vis viva or living force, which 
corresponds to kinetic energy in modern terms. Leibniz takes pains for showing 
that this force is proportional to the square of speed (but we may neglect it here). 
However, we have to notice that the notion of kinetic energy (mv２/2, in modern 
notation, where m and v are mass and velocity, respectively) involves both resistance 
and motion, thus suggesting an amalgamation of passive and active forces. Moreover, 
kinetic energy is a quantity of force resulting from an extended (in time) motion. Recall 
that Leibniz is eager to talk about what is real in each instant of motion (see the 
preceding quotation). All we can infer may be that the velocity v of motion is 
essentially related with “active.”
Another candidate is impetus, and indeed, Leibniz often mentions this, when he 
refers to derivative active force. However, impetus corresponds to the Cartesian 
notion of “quantity of motion” (but Leibniz’s version incorporates the direction of 
motion, i.e., vectorial quantity), which is normally expressed as mv. But again, this 
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involves both passive and active elements, to say the least. Moreover, again, Leibniz 
insists as follows (Ariew and Garber 1989, 120-121):
... we can distinguish the present or instantaneous element of motion from 
that same motion extended through a period of time ...
... the numerical value of a motion [motus] extending through time derives 
from an infinite number of impetuses ...
Thus, when he said “a momentary something” or “a force striving [nitente] toward 
change,” it must be an instantaneous (or infinitesimal) impetus. Then, a derivative 
active force which exists at each moment, if we adopt this candidate, must be this 
instantaneous impetus. This proposal does have textual grounds (however, Leibniz 
seems sometimes sloppy, and for a sympathetic reading, see Bertoloni Meli 1993, 
4.3). But this raises a serious problem especially for the modern reader. For, 
according to the classical (Newtonian) mechanics, in any uniform (inertial) motion, 
there is no force! According to the Second Law of Newton, force is related with 
acceleration, when a motion changes its velocity; thus no acceleration, no force. 
Therefore with this preconception, Leibniz’s insistence on the existence of force, 
even when a body is moving uniformly, should be unintelligible.
However, in order to remove this difficulty, we have to remember that for Leibniz, 
“dynamics is subordinated to metaphysics” (his 1702 paper, referred to in Section 2, 
Ariew and Garber 1989, 252). And my informational interpretation of Monadology 
will be quite helpful in this context. But we will postpone this task for a while (see 
Section 4), and tentatively adopt the view that derivative active force corresponds 
to impetus. If we are focusing on motion at any instant, derivative active force 
corresponds to instantaneous impetus.
In sum, then, derivative forces are two in kind, the active which acts on another, and 
the passive which is being acted on. Motion is an interplay of these two forces. 
Notice that any change of motion, or rather, any change of configuration of bodies, are 
supposed to be the result of this interplay of the two forces. Because of this dual 
aspects, it is quite difficult to separate completely, in our description of such 
changes, the active and the passive. For instance, impetus is described as mv, a 
product of mass and velocity, containing both passive and active forces. Likewise, 
since inertial mass resists any change of motion, in proportion to that mass, both 
active and passive forces appear in this description. Thus, depending on which 
aspect we are interested in, the focus is sometimes on the active, sometimes on the 
passive.
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Then, getting back to the realm of monads again, why do we need the distinction of 
active and passive? Unless a monad is perfect (that is God), it is a created being 
with limitations (it is limited in the faculties of knowing, and often called a finite 
substance). In a letter to de Volder (June 20, 1703), Leibniz clarifies his position as 
follows:
Therefore I distinguish: (1) the primitive entelechy or soul; (2) the matter, 
namely, the primary matter or primitive passive power; (3) the monad made 
up of these two things; (4) the mass [massa] or secondary matter, or the organic  
machine in which innumerable subordinate monads come together; and (5) 
the animal, that is, the corporeal substance, which the dominating monad 
makes into one machine. (Ariew and Garber 1989, 177)
Obviously, the active force comes from the entelechy or soul, the passive from the 
primary matter. Thus, roughly speaking, the primary active force is responsible for 
derivative active force, and the primary passive force for derivative passive. 
However, in the context of dynamics, we have to be more careful, as was pointed 
out above.
The preceding is Leibniz’s classification of force, mainly in terms of his 
metaphysics. However, when he steps into specific problems of dynamics, he 
translates these derivative forces into mathematical concepts, and utilizes 
differential calculus, often with geometrical figures (e.g., Leibniz’s works on 
planetary motion). And in these contexts, several technical concepts are introduced 
with mathematical connotation.
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4. How does Dynamics correspond to Metaphysics?
As we have already seen, the primitive forces of a monad have counterparts in 
phenomena, i.e., derivative forces. And Leibniz repeatedly insists that dynamics is 
indispensable for knowing reality, the realm of monads. So here is a key for 
understanding Leibniz’s view, and removing the preceding difficulty mentioned in 
Section 3. As I have already suggested in Section 1, there are homomorphisms (via 
coding) between the realm of monads and the realm of phenomena. De Risi’s 
excellent work (2007) clarified the significance of Analysis Situs (Leibniz’s work on 
geometry); this is a new branch of geometry based on analysis of situations, and 
focusing on qualitative aspect. In phenomena, coexistent bodies can have various 
relations with each other, and a “situation” is, roughly speaking, a set of such 
relations. In the preceding Section 3, I have used the word “configuration of 
bodies,” in order to suggest “situation.” (This word is borrowed from Julian 
Barbour’s illuminating discussion of the “Machian problem”; see Barbour 2001, 
7-10. A more popular exposition is in Barbour 2000, ch. 5)
But why is this important? Because, bodies correspond to a set of monads, and 
hence a situation involving many bodies provides us with information of the 
relations among those monads. All right, then, what kind of information? The 
qualitative, and not quantitative, information of situations. Space and time are 
products of coding, and they are loaded with quantitative information (metric), such 
as distance or length of duration. Since such quantitative information has nothing 
to do with the realm of monads, Leibniz tried to create a new branch of geometry 
that captures qualitative features of geometry. That way, essential relations among 
monads can be more conspicuously represented. 
Moreover, any changes of situation correspond to motions of those bodies. In other 
words, motions are changes of situation through time. Leibniz was clearly aware of 
the importance of combining geometry and dynamics. In his 1702 paper on body 
and force, after pointing out that there must be dynamicon (innate principle of 
change and persistence) in body, Leibniz continues as follows:
From this it also follows that physics makes use of principles from two 
mathematical sciences to which it is subordinated, geometry and 
dynamics. ... Moreover, geometry itself, or the science of extension, is, in 
turn, subordinated to arithmetic, since as I said above, there is repetition or 
multitude in extension; and dynamics is subordinated to metaphysics, 
which treats cause and effect. (Ariew and Garber 1989, 251-252)
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In this context, Leibniz seems to mean by “geometry” Analysis Situs mentioned 
above. It begins with the notions of congruence and similarity, and tries to construct 
a system of geometry independent of analytical geometry. We have to notice in the 
preceding quotation, Leibniz mentioned arithmetic rather than analysis, and 
mentioned repetition as his reason. This implies, among other things, that the 
quantity of extension (e.g., distance) can be constructed and measured by repeated 
use of unit rod (each use is congruent), and hence arithmetic, rather than analytical 
mathematics is in order. For a thorough study of Leibniz’s Analysis Situs, the reader 
is referred to De Risi (2007).
Now, let us get back to the main line of my argument. According to my 
informational interpretation, the state-transitions of monads underlie these changes 
of situation, motions. And recall that the state-transitions of any monad are 
governed by the primary active force due to entelechy. Thus, this is the decisive 
reason for Leibniz to insist on the existence of derivative active force, in any changes 
of situation (i.e., motion), even when these changes are inertial motions with no 
changes of velocity. See the following Figure 1. When three objects A, B, and C 
moves inertially to A’, B’, and C’ respectively, the situation obviously changes, as 
the two triangles are quite different (notice this difference is qualitative). If one 
grasps this point, one can see that Leibniz is perfectly consistent, and within his 
theory of dynamics, there must be the difference of the notion of force from the 
Newtonian force. Thus the apparent difficulty mentioned in the preceding section 
is removed.
Figure 1: Inertial Motions change Situation
However, we also have to notice that the state-transition of a monad involves both 
active and passive force, because of the dual nature of the monad: it has both 
activity and passivity. Therefore, even though the notion of impetus is expressed in 
terms of both m (mass, due to passive force) and v (velocity, due to active force), 
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there should be no problem. The same dual nature is reflected in phenomena, and 
in dynamics which describes these phenomena.
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5. Living Force and Dead Force
In Specimen Dynamicum (1695), his famous distinction between living force and dead 
force is stated and illustrated (not in terms of analytical method) by a few examples, 
including centrifugal force, gravity, and elasticity. But more technical treatment was 
established and used several years before, in his paper on planetary motion, 
Tentamen de Motuum Coelestium Causis (1689, abridged as Tentamen henceforth). This 
paper, and all related works have been thoroughly studied by Bertoloni Meli (1993), 
and I will heavily depend on his study. We can see that Leibniz, drawing on this 
previous paper, summarizes and explains in non-technical language, some of the 
main results obtained by a more rigorous and analytical method.
Living force corresponds to kinetic energy (in modern terms), but dead force looks 
very strange to the modern reader: it is “an infinitely small urge,” or solicitatio, to 
motion. The idea is that by adding such urges repeatedly (notice “repetition” 
again), the speed of any motion increases. Notice that both living and dead forces 
are active, since they are essential for change. This is the way Leibniz chose for 
describing motion, in conformity with his metaphysical concept of force, “a force striving 
[nitente] toward change.” As a result, Leibniz’s dynamics may look strange, and 
harder to understand than the standard Newtonian mechanics, with the concept of 
force in terms of mass and acceleration. However, acceleration can be reconstructed, 
as a macroscopic effect of repeated increment of speed, in terms of solicitatio, 
infinitely small urge.
 I think the best example for illustrating Leibniz’s way of constructing dynamics 
comes from his later writing, titled Illustratio Tentaminis de Motuum Coelestium 
Causis (1705, abridged as Illustratio) . The reader should be quite familiar with the 
motion of free fall, an example of uniformly accelerated motion. How does Leibniz 
reconstruct this motion in terms of dead force, obtaining finally a motion with 
acceleration, speed, and living force? 
To illustrate this problem, let me adapt Leibniz’s third figure in Illustratio. More 
technical reconstruction in terms of differential calculus has been masterfully made 
by Bertoloni Meli (1993), chapter 4, including curvilinear motions.
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Figure 2: Leibniz’s reconstruction of Acceleration
In Figure 2, time flows from top to bottom, and the increment of speed is expressed 
by a horizontal line. An urge to change, solicitatio, is an infinitesimal quantity; but in 
the Figure, a short line is used, meaning an infinitesimal amount of increment, 
called impulse. Leibniz believes that gravity (which is a kind of dead force, 
according to Leibniz) is due to impulses from ether surrounding and penetrating 
objects, such as earth or moon; so that he means that such representation of motion 
as this Figure is closer (qualitatively closer, say) to actual phenomena, than the 
Newtonian picture in terms of continuous attraction and acceleration (see Section 7). 
Although several authors criticized that Leibniz didn’t have any correct 
understanding of the relationship between dead and living force, Bertoloni Meli 
has argued against them, and convincingly reconstructed Leibnizian dynamics of 
planetary motions in terms of analytical method (Bertoloni Meli, 1993, chh. 4-6). 
Since Specimen Dynamicum is written in a non-technical way, the reader may often 
be misled. That’s the reason why I presented Figure 2, to help the reader’s intuitive 
understanding.
Moreover, as Bertoloni Meli (1993, 88) has pointed out, there is a clear evidence that 
Leibniz had the correct understanding of the relationship between dead and living 
forces (recall that these two fores are both active). In an undated letter to de Volder, 
written at least after November 1698 (Gerhardt vol. 2, 153-163), he discussed the 
motion of free fall, and pointed out the relationship between the socilitatio of gravity 
and the living force of a falling body, as follows. 
Accumulation of solicitatio increases the amount of speed, as we have already seen 
in Figure 2. And the body continues to fall with increasing speed. Thus, the 
solicitatio needs time to increase the speed, and the body needs time also, for falling 
with the increased speed (thus, square of time!). So let solicitatio be expressed by 
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AB, DE, etc. are in!nitesimal impulses. 
The speed gradually increases. 
And acceleration emerges, macroscopically, 
as a result of accumulating solicitatio. 
infinitesimal dx, speed by x (which increases with time); then, in order to obtain the 
living force of the body, we have to consider some quantity that depends on the 
square of time, and that quantity is nothing but the distance the body has fallen; in 
short, the square of speed, the crucial quantity, is obtained, technically by an 
integration of  product of solicitatio and (infinitesimal) distance. Since Leibniz often 
ignores constant factor, he uses “x2” for expressing living force, in the letter to de 
Volder. Of course this corresponds to the kinetic energy of classical mechanics (in the 
standard notation, mv２/2).
In this way, Leibniz’s dynamics can reconstruct Newtonian mechanics, starting 
from a different set of basic concepts. For, Newton’s First Law (of inertia) is 
supported by Leibniz, and also Third Law (equality of action and reaction). And, 
unlike Newton, Leibniz emphasizes the notion of living force (corresponding 
energy), which can be obtained by repetition and accumulation of dead force, 
expressed by solicitatio.  Schematically, “dead force → impetus → living force”; thus I 
think we should include solicitatio into derivative active force, as well as impetus.
However, Leibniz was consistently opposed to Newton’s Law of Gravitation, which 
apparently assumes “action at a distance.” Leibniz tried to explain gravitation, 
sometimes in terms vortices, at other times by interactions between a body and the 
surrounding ether, but his attempts remained a mere hypothesis. But before 
discussing such problems, we have to see Leibniz’s treatment of elastic collisions, 
and his analysis of elasticity itself. Despite the appearance of “old-fashioned topic,” 
Leibniz’s discussion of elasticity, if combined with his metaphysical view, contains 
remarkable ideas and insights, as we will see shortly. 
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6. Collisions and Relativity of Motion
First, we have to remember that, for Leibniz, a material body is a well-founded 
phenomenon, resulting from a set of innumerable monads. In Leibniz scholarship, 
there are unsettled controversies over the nature of body, but we do not have to 
worry about them.  All we need is that a body has a good basis in the realm of 
monads (via coding, of course) , and a body is infinitely divisible, according to 
Leibniz.
From these two assumptions, it follows that any material body has an internal 
structure (indeed an infinity of layers, so to speak), which cannot be exhausted in 
the realm of phenomena; hence Leibniz refuses atomism, as regards the physical 
(phenomenal) world. And at any stage of that structure, derivative forces (active 
and passive) are working. If we keep this in mind, Leibniz’s discussion of collisions 
and elasticity becomes much easier to understand.
Now, Leibniz’s discussion of collisions and elasticity begins in Part 2 of Specimen 
Dynamicum. He asserts again that “force is something absolutely real, even in 
created substances”; so that, he means, the study of motion, dynamics can touch on 
what is real by dealing with the laws governing (derivative) forces in bodies. In 
contrast,
motion as it is taken to contain only geometrical notions (size, shape, and their 
change), is really nothing but the change of situation, and ... as far as the 
phenomena are concerned, motion is a pure relation, ... (sect. 37, Ariew and Garber 
1989, 130)
He points out that this leads to the “equivalence of hypotheses,” the relativity of 
motion, in our words. As regards this idea, he owes a great deal to his teacher, 
Huygens (see Barbour, 2001, 462-468).
From this follows ..., that the equivalence of hypotheses is not changed even by the 
collision of bodies with one another, and thus, that the laws of motion must be 
fixed in such a way that the relative nature of motion is preserved, so that one 
cannot tell, on the basis of the phenomena resulting from a collision, where 
there had been rest or determinate motion in an absolute sense before the 
collision. (ibid.)
Consequently, Leibniz concludes “that the mutual action or impact of bodies on one 
another is the same, provided that they approach one another with the same speed” (ibid.).
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Further, Leibniz draws two more consequences from his notions of bodies and 
forces: (1) what happens in a body (or substance) can be understood to happen 
spontaneously and in an orderly way, and (2) no change happens through a leap 
(the principle of continuity). Then, comes an example of collision.
Figure 3: Collision of Two Bodies
Suppose two bodies A and B collide on a straight line, and then rebound (here, it 
may be assumed that the two bodies have the same mass; another case where this 
assumption is dropped will be discussed in Figure 4). Leibniz argues that the 
change of motion can neither happen instantaneously nor discontinuously. When 
the two bodies collide each other, both begins to deform continuously, and the 
relative speed of the two decreases until it becomes zero and the internal pressure 
(due to deformation) becomes maximal. Let this state be A’ and B’. The change from 
A to A’ must be continuous, and likewise for B and B’. Then rebound begins and its 
force is due to the internal pressure, that is, the (relative) motion of the two bodies 
is transformed into their elastic force, and then released as the driving force of 
rebounding to the opposite direction, again continuously. See Figure 3 (I have 
changed Leibniz’s original Figure, in order to make it simpler).
Thus it is clear that the living force of motion (before and after the collision) is 
closely related with the force due to elasticity. When A and B are at rest with each 
other (A’B’), the living force before the collision has been transformed into the dead 
force of elasticity; and then as rebounding motion begins, the dead force (solicitatio) 
of elasticity is released, and the speed increases until the deformation disappears. If 
A and B are equal in size (mass), rebounding motion recovers the same living force 
as before. Deforming and rebounding occur spontaneously and in an orderly way, 
Leibniz says. 
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But what does “spontaneously” mean here? In any monad, any change of its state 
occurs spontaneously and in an orderly way. But in the context of dynamics, we are 
dealing with a phenomenal motion. And Leibniz is saying that every active or 
passive state of a body is spontaneous, arising from an internal force, even if 
occasioned by something external (Ariew and Garber 1989, 134). Thus he says:
that in impact, both bodies are equally acted upon, and equally act, and that half the 
effect arises from the action of the one, and half from the action of the other. 
(Ariew and Garber 1989, 135)
In short, because of the relativity of motion, the law of collision depends only on 
the relative speed of collision, irrespective of motion or rest of colliding bodies, and 
if the collision is elastic, the conservation of living force holds for each body, taken by 
itself. 
But, of course, the reader may feel that it is too rash to generalize from the 
preceding simple example. So, let me supply an additional example (not in 
Specimen Dynamicum), basically due to Huygens (see Barbour, 2001, 9.4-9.5, for an 
excellent exposition of Huygens’ theory of collisions). He was Leibniz’s teacher of 
mathematics in Paris, and he was one of the first who gave brilliant results on the 
problem of collisions. Suppose two objects, one is larger (its mass is greater) than 
the other, collide on a straight line (to make the example as simple as possible). We 
can describe this collision, from the point of view of what Leibniz called common 
center of gravity (op. cit., sect. 51. The modern term is “center of mass.” See Barbour 
2000, 80). See the following Figure 4, and let us consider the motions of this system 
(we consider only these two objects, for the sake of simplicity). Notice that the 
center of gravity does not change during the whole process of collision and rebound; 
moreover, this center coincides with the point of contact of the two objects, when 
the elastic stress (deformation) is maximal. Then, viewed from this center, the two 
objects approach this center with respective velocities, collide, and rebound with their 
velocities reversed and undiminished! Thus the kinetic energy of each, viewed from this 
center, is conserved individually. This is basically one of Huygens’ discoveries, and 
when Leibniz made the preceding claim that the living force of each object is 
individually conserved, he must have grounded this claim on such discoveries as 
this.
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Figure 4: Collision and the Center of Gravity
Now it may not always be the case that collisions are like this, and there may arise a 
case the deformation by collision does not recover completely. But then, Leibniz 
claims that the seemingly “lost” living force is transformed into another form, 
within deformed bodies. This problem will be discussed later (Section 8), when we 
examine Leibniz’s distinction between total and partial, as regards living force. 
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7. All Motion is Rectilinear or composed of Rectilinear Motions
Towards the end of Specimen Dynamicum, Leibniz repeats an important claim, 
which probably first appeared in his paper on planetary motion, Tentamen (1689). 
Since this claim is indispensable (whether or not you like it) for understanding 
Leibniz’s theory of motion, let me quote:
Also, since only force and the nisus [effort] arising from it exist at any moment 
(for motion never really exists, as we discussed above), and since every nisus 
tends to in a straight line, it follows that all motion is either rectilinear or 
composed of rectilinear motions. (Ariew and Garber 1989, 135)
This is the true reason why he tried to dispense with Newtonian notion of 
acceleration, and to reconstruct acceleration and curvilinear motions, in general,
in terms of  rectilinear motions, including solicitatio which is a mathematical 
expression of nisus. Recall the Figure 2 in Section 5. He consistently adheres to his 
metaphysical view. Thus, if one ignores this point, Leibniz’s dynamics may look 
cumbersome or even unintelligible. And, we cannot deny that, because of this 
feature, Leibniz’s dynamics became much harder to understand than the 
Newtonian mechanics, especially to the modern reader. Nevertheless, his dynamics 
is, on a closer look, consistent and moreover nicely connected with metaphysics, 
which is, on my reading, nothing but a theory of information in terms of monads. 
This novelty is really amazing.
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8. Living Force: Total and Partial
Another important feature in Specimen Dynamicum is the distinction between total 
and partial living force. Partial force is further divided into (a) “relative/proper” 
and (b) “directive/common”: (a) belongs to the parts, and (b) is common to the 
whole. What does this distinction mean, and what significance does it have? 
Relative or proper living force is simply the force of interactions between the parts (of 
a single body), and directive or common force is the force that which contributes to 
the determination of the relative velocity (speed and direction) when two bodies 
collide. Further, Leibniz means that (a) plus (b) equals the total living force of a body.
Now, this is not a mere “pedantic” distinction. In the classical mechanics, the 
kinetic energy of a body is determined by its mass m and velocity v, i.e. mv２/2. But 
Leibniz is saying, in effect, that aside from the kinetic energy of a moving body, we 
also have to consider its internal energy, and that is (a)! Thus, if any deformation 
caused by collisions or any other ways does not recover, and if the living force of a 
body may seem to be lost, Leibniz can refer to this partial (relative) living force.  
Notice that, according to Leibniz, a body is infinitely divisible, and at any stage of 
division, motions of parts exist within the body. This view is really amazing in that it 
may be regarded as a precursor of  Einstein’s notion of “rest energy” (Einstein 
1905b), E = mc2 (c is the velocity of light). But, of course, in order to substantiate this 
claim, we have to examine Leibniz’s metaphysical view also. Let us turn now to 
Leibniz’s metaphysics, Monadology. (In order to discuss the relevance of Leibniz’s 
dynamics to Einstein’s theory of special relativity, we have to clarify the scope of 
his dynamics, together with his theory of space and time; so that we still have to 
wait.)
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9. Active vs. Passive in Monadology
When we turn from Leibniz’s work on dynamics, Specimen Dynamicum, to 
Monadology, the last summary of his metaphysics, we are somehow puzzled by the 
absence of the word “force,” which was crucial in dynamics. There is only one 
section (48), where the word “power” appears. Instead, the pair of “active/action” 
and “passive/passion” appears frequently. Thus we have to understand that 
Leibniz is continuing his discussion of “active force and passive force” in a 
somehow different terminology. Recall his descriptions of dynamical interaction in 
terms of “act on” and “to be acted on.” Therefore, despite the difference of 
terminology, we have no reason to suspect that Leibniz abandoned the concept of 
force in his later metaphysics.
As I understand, Leibniz is promoting his “informational turn” of 1695, and in 
Monadology, he seems to be emphasizing the informational features, and thus the 
concepts relevant to dynamics are now hidden from the foreground. This is 
presumably the reason why he characterizes the distinction between active and 
passive, in  terms of perceptual distinctness. Here are two typical statements (Ariew 
and Garber 1989, 219):
The creature is said to act externally insofar as it is perfect, and to be acted 
upon [patir] by another, insofar as it is imperfect. Thus we attribute action to 
a monad  insofar as it has distinct perceptions, and passion, insofar as it has 
confused perceptions ... (sect. 49)
And one creature is more perfect than another insofar as one finds in it that 
which provides an a priori reason for what happens in the other; and this is 
why we say that it acts on the other. (sect. 50) 
But, of course, this manner of speaking is only ideal, since there are neither mutual 
communications nor influences between monads, in reality; God manipulates them, 
as if there are mutual influences, via His programming.
Now, in the preceding two statements, there is an important problem to be clarified. 
First, Leibniz presents (1) the distinction between perfect and imperfect monads. 
Second, he refers to (2) the distinction between distinct and confused perceptions. 
Third, he evokes (3) the distinction between “act on” and “to be acted on” among 
monads. Fourth, (4) he states, as a basis of saying that a monad is “more perfect” 
than another,  that “something being an a priori reason for what happens in 
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another.” Offhand, it seems hard to see any clear connections among these four 
distinctions.
As regards (1), Leibniz suggests another sense, somehow different from the sense 
related to (2). In sections 41 and 42 of Monadology, he says “God is absolutely 
perfect---perfection being nothing but the magnitude of positive reality,” and that 
“creatures derive their perfections from God’s influence, but they derive their 
imperfections from their nature.” This magnifies our problem: how are distinct 
perceptions related with perfection of these sections?
It seems that Leibniz is talking about absolute sense of perfection, when he refers to 
the perfections of God and creatures, in sections 41 and 42. Whereas when he tries 
to define perfection in terms of distinct perceptions, he seems to relativize the notion 
of perfection. For instance, a monad is more perfect than another in such-and-such 
respect, but it may be more imperfect than another, in another different respect. For 
it is quite natural that some of a monad’s perceptions are more distinct and others 
are more confused, in comparison with another monad’s perceptions. Moreover, 
this relativization is consonant with the relativity of “act on” and “to be acted on”; a 
monad, or a body (in phenomena), sometimes can act on another, and it may be 
acted on by another at other times. As we have already seen, in elastic collisions, 
one body act on, and is acted on, by another, so that action and passion are mutual. 
So, for a while we will try this reading, and we will see the results soon, after my 
presentation of details of my informational interpretation.
However, even at this stage, one thing is clear. The relative sense of perfection 
(according to my tentative reading) is obviously informational, in that it is 
dependent on distinctness of a perception, a state of a monad. Distinctness suggests 
that informational content of perception is well-articulated, more informative; 
confusedness suggests the contrary, i.e. more noise, less informative. And we have 
to keep in mind that the created monads are all limited in the capacity of 
perception.
Monads are limited, not as to their objects, but with respect to their 
knowledge of them. Monads all go confusedly to infinity, to the whole; but 
they are limited and differentiated by the degrees of their distinct 
perceptions. (section 60, Ariew and Garber 1989, 220-221.)
Then, one feature of the relative perfection may be (a) more informative. But this 
alone does not seem to serve as a basis of saying that one acts on another, i.e., (3) 
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above. No doubt, “action” is a crucial key word for Leibniz, both in dynamics and 
metaphysics. 
In view of this, (4) seems much better in that it refers to “a reason for what happens 
in the other.” In dynamics, the motion of two bodies in collision was explained, 
according to Leibniz, as follows: “that in impact, both bodies are equally acted 
upon, and equally act, and that half the effect arises from the action of one, and half 
from the action of the other” (see Section 6). Thus action and passion are mutual, 
which clearly shows the relativity of action. And his explanation referred to active 
and passive forces, the “innate principle of change and persistence.”
I think we should take Leibniz’s explanation seriously. He was saying, in effect, that 
after the contact of two bodies in this collision,  each body changes according to its 
own forces of action and passion, that is, deformation, rebound, and then modified 
motion with a constant velocity. This must be interpreted as the change according 
to the law of dynamics, without evoking the teleological laws of monads.
But this was a story in the phenomenal world. What story is there, in the realm of 
monads, corresponding to this? The changes in the monads must be the ultimate 
basis for what happens in the phenomenal world. And in this context, Leibniz is 
talking about “more perfect,” “action and passion,” and “a priori reason” for saying 
one monad is more perfect, acting on another.
Here, the word “a priori reason” strikes me. Since this is the most important clue for 
clarifying the relation between active and passive, let me dwell on this point. As we 
have already seen, the monads are created and programmed by God, as if there were 
mutual communications among them, but in reality each is self-sufficient, changing 
its state spontaneously according to its own transition function (programmed by 
God). God’s programming is the ultimate source of the pre-established harmony. 
Thus, Leibniz’s qualification “a priori” becomes quite natural, if he has the program 
of each monad in his mind. Leibniz, of course, did not have this word “program,” but 
what he says about primitive active force, the internal principle for changes of state, 
perfectly matches what we mean by “program” or “transition function.” Above all, 
any activity (source of changes) and passivity (resistance to change) of a monad 
should originate from its program or transition function.
Now, although he refers to “distinct perceptions” many times, it seems rather hard 
to make sense of this reference. Since a perception is a mere transitory state of 
monad, it determines the next state only together with its transition function, and the 
source of change is in the latter, its operation being called appetition (see Section 1, (3); 
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this is already pointed out in Adams 1993, 380). Therefore, if we wish to talk about 
any “a priori reason” for what happens in one monad and another, we are inevitably 
led to transition functions and appetitions. As was actually the case with dynamic 
collisions, any change must be seen as a process, rather than as an instantaneous 
event. This makes our task much easier, and I think this is one of the virtues of my 
informational interpretation.
But in order to continue my exposition, let me insert a brief note on the structure of 
programs. Taking a simplest example of programming, let us see how a Turing 
machine is programmed, and how it works. This will help a great deal, in order to 
understand what Leibniz is trying to say, without using the terminology of the 
theory of information in the 20th and 21st century. (If the reader is familiar with 
this, just skip the next section. For all those who are unfamiliar with this topic, let 
me advise that learning the theory of information is quite useful for understanding 
Leibniz’s metaphysics! In this connection, I am delighted that Davis’ book (2011) on 
Turing begins from Leibniz!)
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10. The Structure of a Program: Turing Machine
Alan Turing’s famous paper (1936) on computability introduced an imaginary 
machine, later called “Turing Machine,”consisting of a control unit (an automaton 
that can have only a finite number of states, i.e., a finite automaton) with a tape-
head, and an infinite tape that can store discrete information (0 or 1) on each square 
of it. It can (1) “read” the square under scan, (2) “write” 1 or 0 (“erase” 1 on the 
square), and (3) “move” either to the right square or to the left square. Each natural 
number can be coded on the tape; for instance, zero by single”1” (other squares are 
all “blank (0)”, the tape-head on the immediate left square of the marked one. 
Likewise, any n-tuple of natural numbers  <m1, ..., mn> can be represented 
(encoded) on the tape, e.g., by a sequence of n groups of marks, a blank square in 
between two groups playing the role of “comma,” but details do not matter, for our 
purpose. The important point is that the whole system (including the tape) is an 
infinite-state machine, although the control unit is a finite machine. This means, it is 
possible for this machine to store potentially infinite amount of information, because 
of the infinite tape. See Figure 5.
Figure 5: Turing Machine
Later, Hao Wang (1957) proposed a “program-version” of this machine. Instead of 
what a machine does and what it produces as the final result, Wang focuses on its 
program, a sequence of instructions. The primitive instructions are only 6 in kind, as 
follows:
right: go to right (one square) 
left: go to left (one square)
mark: write “1” (if “1” is there, leave it as it is)
erase: erase the mark on the square (if no mark, leave it as it is)
transfer to k: if “1” is on the square, jump to the k-th instruction
stop: 
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A Turing Machine with 
a Tape encoding “zero” as its input
A program is a sequence of these instructions, and the last instruction must be 
“stop.” Of course, there must be a certain grammer in any program; e.g., in order for 
“transfer to k” to be meaningful, the program has to contain at least k instructions. 
This instruction of “transfer” is very important, because this is the key for recursion, 
as we will see shortly. But again, details do not matter for our purpose.
Most Leibniz scholars may be disappointed by this Turing machine. But I am not 
saying that a monad is a Turing machine. All I wish to say is that to know the 
structure of a program for this machine is quite illuminating for understanding 
many of Leibniz’s important texts. Let us see what a Turing machine does, when it 
is given an initial configuration (input) on the tape. For instance, suppose given a 
natural number m (encoded on the tape), program P starts and ends with an output 
n. This can be written as follows:
m  P→  n
This is not interesting. But if this program P is such that, given any natural number n, 
it ends with the value of the function f, i.e., f(n), as its output, we can say “P computes 
function f,” and this is certainly significant. For instance, if, for any n,
 n  S→  n+1,
then S computes the successor function f(n) = n+1. This is of course a function with one 
variable, but we can easily handle a function with any finite number of variables, 
and write a program that computes that function. Thus, a computable (i.e., Turing 
computable) function can be represented by a program that computes it. In essence, 
this is the definition of computability in terms of a program for the Turing machine.
In order to accomplish this task, all we need is a few more procedures. It is easy to  
compose a more complex program from two or more subprograms. If we have two 
programs P and Q such that
n  P→  f(n)   and   n  Q→  g(n),
we can compose larger programs (“stop” instruction must be deleted for the first 
program) <P, Q> and <Q, P>, and the order of programs makes a big difference:
n  <P, Q>→  g(f(n))   and   n  <Q, P>→  f(g(n)).
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Thus we easily see that a hierarchy of functions, f within g and g within f, can be 
represented by an ordered composition of programs.
Next, we need a program for deleting a part of input. Given k+1 numbers ( in 
encoded configuration on the tape), this program E1 deletes the first item:
n, m1, ..., mk   E1 →  m1, ..., mk
This program is not trivial but indispensable, because, without it, we have no 
means for deleting unnecessary information. In order to make something 
conspicuous, one has to delete other things. In order to show the final output, we 
have to delete whatever remains in the process of computation (and our coding 
requires that).
Finally, we need a program which constitute an essential part of recursion, that is, 
repeating something and accumulating results. This program I(P)  iterates program P, 
n times (n is a specified number). Supposing P acts on an input m (which may be an 
ordered set of k numbers), and ends with output f(m),
n, m   I(P) →  n, fn(m)  where fn(m) is the result of repeated computation of 
the same function f , n times, f(f(...f(m)...)).
The power of recursion becomes powerful, when this program is applied to itself, 
thus when nested recursion occurs. For instance, although successor function (its 
program version is S) may look trivial, if you iterate this m times, you can 
accomplish addition n+m. This can be shown as follows: Suppose S is applied to 
input n. Then you obtain n+1. 
! n  S→  n+1
So, next, suppose I(S) is applied to input m, n; then S (applied to n) is repeated m 
times, and the result is:
! m, n  I(S)→  m, n+m
Thus by adding program E1, the larger program <I(S), E1 > can compute addition n
+m. 
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Multiplication can be obtained by repeated addition, thus another recursion (i.e., a 
recursion of another recursion). But we need a little technique. First. let us notice 
the following chain of operation:
! n, 0  I(S)→ n, n  I(S)→ n, 2n  I(S)→ n, 3n . . .
 
Thus, if we repeat this process m times, mn can be obtained. I(S) is applied to input 
n, 0. And since we wish to repeat this application m times, I(I(S)) must be applied to 
input m, n, 0. That is, 
m, n, 0   I(I(S)) →  m, n, mn
Then, by deleting the first two numbers, the final output can be made the result of 
multiplication. However, we wish to start from input m, n, not a triplet. So, starting 
from the pair, just add the third element 0 at the outset (making a new entry, so to 
speak, for storing the result of computation); then apply I(I(S)). This composition 
makes a perfect program for multiplication. 
This is enough for our purpose. But I wish to emphasize this: If you think this is 
merely an elementary lesson of arithmetic, you are wrong! Later, I will argue that 
Leibniz was trying to construct his dynamics on the foundations of arithmetic, 
geometry of situations, and his theory of information (Monadology). Notice that 
arithmetic is certainly abundant in recursion. This is my conjecture, but Leibniz 
must have been  aware of the importance of recursion, when he emphasized the 
process of repetition.
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11. A Program has a Structure with many Layers
Getting back to Monadology, let me speak for a while in the ideal (“as if”) mode 
without inserting this qualification, for the sake of brevity, in order to talk about 
“communications” among monads. I have already said that matter is infinitely 
divisible, and this implies that there are infinitely many sub-layers within a body. An 
organized body (or organism, for short) is often called “natural or divine machine,” 
and since it is governed by a monad called “anima” (or soul), it is also called 
“animal.” Further, recall that any such natural machine or animal is the “result” of 
an organization of innumerable monads. Each of such monads must be individually 
programmed by God, in view of the whole organization, and this is the pre-
established harmony. I have been surprised that very few (if any) Leibniz-scholars 
are aware of the close connection between machines and automata; presumably 
because they are not interested in the theory of information. 
Many layers and organized: this certainly produces a hierarchy of programs. That is, 
there must be, on the top, the program of the monad which governs the whole 
organism, and under this, many and various programs or subprograms follow, ad 
infinitum. Needless to say, these programs correspond, respectively, to the transition 
functions of those monads which are the source of the whole organism. 
Strictly speaking, program and transition function must be distinguished: a 
program is a sequence of instructions for realizing the corresponding transition 
function; the same transition function can be realized by several different programs, 
especially when the programmer uses different coding. But we may often use these 
two words, “program” and “transition function,” interchangeably, when there is no 
danger of confusion. In information theory, any (finite) automaton governed by a 
transition function can be described in terms of a corresponding program. And as I 
have explained in Section 10, even an infinite automaton, such as Turing machine 
(with unlimited tapes), can be identified with its program, for most purposes (the 
general nature of infinite automata is not clear to date).
Now we have been concerned with the distinction between active and passive in 
Monadology. I suggest that there may be several different ways to define the 
distinction between active and passive, based on the preceding hierarchy of 
programs. But the most straightforward way woud be: basically, if a program (in the 
whole) is subordinated to another as a subprogram, it may be called passive and the 
other active, and the same is true of each monad corresponding to these programs. 
This distinction is of course relative, so that, e.g., program A may be active relative 
to B, but passive relative to C. Moreover, this distinction depends on context; a 
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program P may contain a subprogram Q, but P may also appear in Q; i.e., recursion 
occurs (often, as in our computer programs). For example, as we have seen in 
Section 10, there is a program I which iterate a subprogram S a specified number of 
times, which is expressed as I(S). Namely, if we apply this program to number n, 
this program repeats S, n times. Thus it roughly says, in our ordinary language 
(since instructions are expressed in imperative mood), “S, you repeat your job n 
times.” The important technical point is that the procedure of I is exactly the same, 
even when it is applied to any natural number (i.e., the program, which is a series of 
instructions, does not change at all). 
Now we come to the crucial point: S can be I(S) itself, so that I(I(S)) is meaningful; 
this is recursion. Thus, according to my proposal, the master program, outer I is 
active, and subprogram I(S) is passive; this contextual dependence is all right, because 
a program can have a recursive structure. Despite the fact that Leibniz did not use 
the word “recursion,” he was well aware of this, as we will see shortly.
Although this proposal works only within individual organic body, it can capture at 
least some important aspects of Leibniz’s distinction. For a program imposes a 
certain task to several subprograms under its control; so that “an a priori reason” 
why any subprograms are doing what they do, can be given by that program. 
Above all, the anima of an organism is a “miniature” of God, in that it unifies the 
whole, the most perfect in that organism. If we may use an analogy in terms of an 
animal (like dog, cat, or human), it can have most distinct perceptions of the external 
world, despite the fact that many physical, physiological, and unconscious 
processes are underlying such perceptions in consciousness; here I am assuming 
that the governing program reside in consciousness (this seems to be close to 
Leibniz’s own view, since he called such a governing monad anima or soul).
And finally, let me add that Leibniz himself was aware of the recursive structure in 
the organized monads, although he never used such words as “recursion” or 
“recursive function.” As a strong evidence for this claim, let me quote this 
(Monadology section 67, Ariew and Garber 1989, 222):
Each portion of matter can be conceived as a garden full of plants, and as a 
pond full of fish. But each branch of a plant, each limb of an animal, each 
drop of its humors, is still another such garden or pond.
Many readers may regard this as a poetic metaphor. It is poetic, all right. But its 
content is perfectly logical also, in that Leibniz is here suggesting that the infinite 
divisibility of matter corresponds to the recursive structure of an organization of 
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monads, the recursive structure of the program and subprograms governing such 
an organization! Thus this poetic quotation strongly supports my informational 
interpretation of Monadology.
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12. Divine Machines and Cellular Automata
It may be instructive to try this interpretation from another perspective, in order to 
see how Leibniz’s other key words may fit in this interpretation. Besides, some 
appropriate way to handle communications among many bodies may be suggested 
in our discussion. 
Suppose we are focusing on the flow of information in an organism; this flow must be 
reflected in the hierarchy of programs. Borrowing one of Leibniz’s favorite 
examples, the “roar of the sea,” we perceive that great noise, roughly as follows. 
Each of innumerable waves raises a small noise, and all of such noises reach our 
body (ears, in particular) and a bunch of complex processes will go on. At some 
stage, what Leibniz calls “petites perceptions” (minute perceptions) appear. Our 
anima cannot recognize them, but their overall effect is the “roar of the sea,”which 
everyone can perceive, although no one can distinguish the sound of each wave, 
except for a few large ones. Thus the roar is a confused perception. However, only 
the anima can have this perception, presumably, neither our body, nor any organs in 
our body can, including ears. Nevertheless, that perception is a product of the 
works made by various subprograms (in the ears and other organs in our body).
In this example, the (external) information flows from each waves to our ears, and 
finally to our anima. Now suppose there are a thousand of observers in various 
locations on the sea, concentrating on a few waves and listen to their sound. Each 
of these observations are certainly more distinct! Then, these observations, which 
may be regarded as corresponding to our minute perceptions, may be in some sense 
more distinct than our perception of the roar. But when these noises reach us on the 
shore, our perceptions are confused. This shows that, as far as the flow of information 
is concerned, more distinct perceptions become less distinct, as it propagates to a 
distant place (also it take time); so that it may be misleading to say that distinctness 
is a good mark for attributing activity. That’s one of my reasons for invoking the 
structure of program, in order to distinguish activity from passivity.
This is a story of the flow of information in our phenomenal world. However, 
Leibniz says similar things even as regards monads governing organisms.
... although each created monad represents the whole universe, it more 
distinctly represents the body which is particularly affected by it, and whose 
entelechy it constitutes. (Monadology, sect. 62, Ariew and Garber 1989, 221)
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And notice that in the realm of monads, there is neither spatial distance nor temporal 
duration. Then, why is there this difference of the body of a monad and the rest of 
the world, in the monad’s perceptions of them? In the realm of monads, the flow of 
information may have no constraints comparable with that in the phenomenal 
world. This question may lead us to a surprising discovery in our interpretation of 
Leibniz’s physics and metaphysics.
Leibniz’s answer to this question would be something like this (with free 
paraphrasing in modern terms): the anima of a given body controls the body by its 
program (and hence active), but not waves or their sounds, which do not belong to 
the body; this difference comes from God’s organization of monads. In short,  the 
reason for the limited capacity of perception is: aside from the limitation of created 
monads themselves, God’s organization of the monads in terms of various units, each 
of which has one entelechy governing its body (corresponding to a collection of 
other monads, in reality). Each monad is programmed, but in each unit, there is a 
definite hierarchy of these programs.
There should be various connections between waves and people on the shore, but 
neither water nor people can have any distinct perceptions of such connections. 
Only God can take care of this matter. But, here, we have to remember Leibniz’s 
consistent view of plenum, that vacuum cannot exist and the phenomenal world is 
filled with matter without void. This means that, in the case of our perception of the 
roar of the sea, when each sound of wave travels to our ears, its path is completely 
filled with other bodies of various kind. What are these bodies? They are of course 
bodies each governed by an entelechy, so that each of them corresponds to a group of 
monads organized in a certain way. 
So, here is a surprising discovery (I pointed this out in my 2009 paper, Glymour, 
Wei, and Westerståhl 2009, 346)! John von Neumann proposed, around the middle 
of the 20th century, the notion of cellular automaton, in order to show that a self-
reproducing automaton is possible. It is a larger automaton composed of many unit 
automata (they are “cells” as it were). Let me briefly explain. Von Neumann 
assumed a two-dimensional cellular space, where the same unit automata are 
arranged in an infinite grid-circuit, and each is connected with four neighbors. They 
shear the boundary, so to speak; inserting double arrows is only a manner of 
depicting, and they can be deleted, as long as the relation of neighbor is kept in mind. 
Thus, von Neumann’s cellular space can be made into a plenum, with no vacant 
spot in it! According to von Neumann’s original version, the unit automaton can 
have 29 states (but later researches reduced the number of states to a much smaller 
number). See Figure 6 (see also Burks 1970, 9; for a reconstruction of self-
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reproducing automata in terms of Wang’s program version of Turing machine, see 
Thatcher 1970).
Figure 6: Von Neumann’s Cellular Space
Now, the point of a cellular automaton, i.e., an organized automaton from many unit 
automata in the cellular space, is that it can do various things, including universal 
computation and self-reproduction (a case of universal construction). Leibniz 
suggested basically a similar idea more than 300 years ago, although he did not 
have an appropriate word for that, except for “body,” or “corporeal substance.” His 
words are old-fashioned, but his idea is as new as von Neumann’s brilliant idea. 
And sometimes Leibniz uses other expressions, such as “divine machine” or 
“natural automaton” (Monadology, sect. 64, etc.), and this is another strong support 
for my claim. And you may see the importance of this idea that by organizing unit 
automata (monads, in Leibniz), we can make a much powerful automaton. In 
Leibniz, the whole world may be regarded as a single cellular automaton, both in 
reality and in phenomena, according to my interpretation.
Further, we can find many other texts which support my claim. In section 61 of 
Monadology, Leibniz’s discussion of the limitations of a monad is extended to 
“composite substances” (organized bodies, each governed by an entelechy). The 
limitations, i.e., that a monad can represent the whole universe, but since its 
perceptions can be distinct only for a limited portion, the rest of perceptions are 
confused.
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In this respect, composite substances are analogous to simple substances. 
For everything is a plenum, which makes all matter interconnected. In a 
plenum, every motion has some effect on distant bodies, in proportion to 
their distance. For each body is affected, not only by those in contact with it, 
and in some way feels the effects of everything that happens to them, but 
also, through them, it feels the effects of those in contact with the bodies 
with which it is itself immediately in contact. (Ariew and Garber 1989, 221)
According to Leibniz, the phenomenal universe is filled with matter, divine 
machines, ether, etc., and each body has its neighbors immediately in contact. And he 
is saying that communication between bodies are made through their boundaries 
(which must be two-dimensional surfaces); the information from distant bodies can 
be transferred by a chain of such immediate contacts. Thus he is in effect suggesting 
that the universe is filled with innumerable cells (some are large, and maybe each is 
a divine machine) , and such cells communicate through their boundaries. The 
seemingly vacant space is filled with ether (see Figure 7, which is nothing but a 
crude sketch. Each body, or “cell,” shares boundaries with many neighbors in the 
plenum). Hence, according to Leibniz, the actual space is a “cellular space,” so to 
speak. Therefore, he is certainly qualified to be called the first proponent of 
“cellular automata,” although the honor of working out the details goes to von 
Neumann.
Figure 7:  Leibniz’s Cellular Space
Moreover, Leibniz supported this picture by his metaphysics of monads. God 
organized monads into groups, and these groups are the basis of cellular automata 
in the phenomenal world. Thus, Leibniz doubly utilized the notion of cellular 
automata, in reality and in phenomena.
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Let me finish my discussion of cellular automata. As I have already quoted, 
Leibniz, in section 62 of Monadology, said that “although each created monad 
represents the whole universe, it more distinctly represents the body which is 
particularly affected by it” (this time, my own italics). The comparison here is 
between the monad’s perceptions (representation) of the “whole universe” and of 
“the monad’s body,” but the same can be said of the monad’s perceptions of any 
bodies other than its own. As I understand, although Leibniz here seems to be talking 
about distinct perceptions, he is rather stating the reason why its perception of its own 
body is more distinct than other representations (of universe, of other external 
objects). That reason is the second italicized phrase. Namely, the monad particularly 
affects its body; because of this close relation, the monad represents its body distinctly. 
In my own words: the monad (or its program) controls the body (or its program, 
and through it, all of its subprograms), and hence distinctly represents it. The 
monad’s program is not only its own program, but also the dominant program of 
the whole cellular automaton composed of itself and its body. 
Now let us remember that, from Section 9, we have been dealing with the 
distinction between “active and passive” in Monadology. Our discussion is still 
incomplete, but I think I have shown so far that my interpretation of the distinction 
is promising. In terms of the relation of a program and its subprograms, we can 
take care of “a priori reasons” Leibniz evoked, and also of “distinct/confused” 
perceptions, even giving a reason for that distinction. What remains is the relation of 
“act on” and “to be acted on,” which seems particularly relevant to dynamics.
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13. Relativity of Action and Passion, based on Recursion
  
I order to discuss the details of one monad acting on another, and of the latter being 
acted on by the former, I wish to make clear my assumptions for the whole 
discussion. 
First, I assume that the information of the monads (individually and taken together) is 
conserved, this being Leibniz’s own assumption, although it is hard to find any 
explicit statement on this (because he did not use the word “information”). 
However, since the world of monads must be conserved unless God decides to 
annihilate it, the transition functions (programs) of the monads must be preserved 
as long as the real world exists.
Second, I assume the primitive force is another name of the essental part of the 
information contained in a monad (remember that the monad is given at once, 
including all its changes). But what is essential? None other than the transition 
function (realized by its program) of the monad; for, given the initial state 
(perception) of a monad, everything is determined by that function. And, in order 
to avoid tedious expressions, I say “transition function” for expressing the whole 
series of a monad’s states, which is equivalent with “the transition function plus the 
initial state.” But recall that the primitive force consists in the active force (from the 
entelechy) and the passive force (from the primary matter). 
Third, therefore, I assume that the transition function is concerned both with active 
and passive forces. This may look a truism, but worth mentioning, since some people 
may misunderstand that only active force is involved in any change. But, of course, 
in order to change a state (perception) of any monad, all monads must be involved, 
and in the change of that state both action and passion are necessary, since “acting 
on” presupposes something “to be acted on.” Remember that both elements 
(expressed in phenomena, i.e., derivative forces) are contained in impetus (mv or its 
infinitesimal element) as well as in living force (mv２/2). If we neglect this point, 
Leibniz’s dynamics (which is subordinated to metaphysics) may become 
unintelligible!
And fourth and finally, I assume “the transition function of a monad” and “the 
program of that monad” (together with its initial state) are equivalent, despite my 
previous remark, since from now on, we will be talking about God’s programs. 
Although there can be a number of different programs for realizing the same 
transition function, God will choose the optimal program together with his coding. 
Thus we have no need for considering any other possible programs. However, 
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depending on contexts, we will often exchange one word for the other; when we 
wish to make explicit the current state of a monad, transition function is more 
appropriate, and when we wish to point out recursion, program may be more 
appropriate. And in this connection, we will introduce the following symbolism for 
expressing a state-transition of monad:
(1) f([x])=[x’]: the transition function f is applied to the current state [x], and 
the next state is [x’]. (NB, “next” does not imply time; it only means order 
in the given series of all states, hence I adopted the symbol usually 
employed for the “successor” of a natural number) 
(2) Alternatively, we may simply write: [x]→[x’]
(3) Further, we may express the nth successor as [xn].  
With these preparations, let us examine the consequences from my interpretation of 
“active/passive” in terms of the hierarchical structure of programs. We can easily 
see the relativity and contextual character of this distinction. To repeat the example of 
the program of iteration I(P), I is active relative to another program P in this 
context, but if we find the same program I within the context of P, where I is acting 
on another program S, thus P containing as part I(S), I is active relative to S but 
passive relative to P; I(I(S)) is a particularly clear example, in that the outer I is 
active whereas inner I(S) is passive relative to the outer. It is clear that this trick is 
made possible by recursion. And this seems quite in conformity with what Leibniz 
says in the text of Monadology. According to the terminology of “act on” and “to be 
acted on,” I act on P in the context of I(P), but I is acted on by P when I appears as a 
subprogram of P. 
However, we have to be very careful here. Leibniz is talking about interactions 
between two monads, and we do not know whether or not such programs as I or P 
above represent the program of a monad. So we may have to switch to “transition 
function.” On the other hand, however, Leibniz often reminds us of the ideality of 
any relations among monads. When he says “one monad acting on another,” this is 
only a manner of speaking for describing what happens within the perceptions of a 
single monad. Because of the pre-established harmony among the monads, every 
monad represents the whole universe in its own way, and this is solely governed by 
its own program or transition function. Thus, there is a perfectly legitimate manner 
of speaking that a program “acts on its subprogram” or “being acted on by 
another.” And in every monad, the whole universe is represented as a series of 
perceptions (many are confused, though), i.e., all values of f([x]), [x] running from 
the initial state ad infinitum, which I stipulated to call its “transition function”; this 
is what we always have to keep in mind.
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And now, let me remind the reader of the following important passage from section 
61 of Monadology:
every body is affected by everything that happens in the universe, to such 
an extent that he who sees all can read in each thing what happens 
everywhere, and even what has happened or what will happen, by 
observing in the present what is remote in time as well as in space. (Ariew 
and Garber 1989, 221)
Le us call this person, “he who sees all,” Leibniz’s demon. Notice that Leibniz’s 
demon appeared well before the famous demon described by Laplace, and much 
stronger than it! Leibniz’s demon is logically possible, because all monads together 
with their transition functions are given at once, with the pre-established harmony 
among them. 
However, I have to point out here, that this demon has to know God’s coding also, in 
order to know how reality and the phenomena correspond to each other. Reading 
the phenomenal information contained in a body, is not sufficient for reconstructing 
the program in the monads (reality), and unless you know God’s coding, you can 
neither know this program nor the whole history of the world. You can clearly see 
this point, as soon as you recall a Turing machine. Unless you know how numbers 
are encoded on the tape, you cannot decode a bunch of marks on the tape!
With this proviso in mind, we may revise or extend, the preceding statement of the 
demon. Namely, we can say that by examining the program of a single monad, the 
demon can know the whole history of the world, reality and phenomena. This 
justifies me for continuing the preceding manner of speaking, about action and 
passion, in terms of programs, in order to see more of its consequences.
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14. Recursion in the Phenomena
Then, in view of this, what can we say about derivative forces in the phenomenal 
world? Obviously, such relativity and contextual dependence must be somehow 
reflected in dynamics. So let us reexamine Leibniz’s dynamics in view of my 
interpretation of “active/passive.”
First, take an inertial motion with velocity v. For Leibniz, “absolute velocity” does 
not make sense, and hence this v is only nominal. A more serious problem is that 
we cannot discuss any motion without something which has a velocity. Thus we 
have to assume some body with mass m, and as soon as we introduce a body, we 
have to take passive force contained in that body into consideration. And as I have 
already made clear in Section 4, Leibniz has a good reason, given his metaphysics 
and analysis situs (qualitative geometry), to assume an active force working even in 
this inertial motion. Therefore, at any instant of motion, there is an infinitesimal 
impetus (or nisus). But, of course, impetus mv is an amalgamation of active and 
passive, and so is its infinitesimal element. An active (derivative) force striving 
toward change is represented by v, a passive (derivative) force resisting this force is 
represented by m (including the degree of resistance), and the result is represented 
by the product mv, and this balanced state (i.e., a linear uniform motion) persists 
unless further changes are added by some means. In short, an inertial motion must 
be described in terms of both active and passive derivative forces. 
Now, with this simple example of inertial motion, where are the relativity and 
contextual character of “active/passive” reflected? First of all, an inertial motion 
has to be placed within the context of the whole (or a larger portion) of the 
phenomenal world. However, it is not clear how Leibniz would treat “the whole 
phenomenal world,” and his dynamics remained incomplete. This problem is later 
taken up by Ernst Mach, and other proponents of relationalism (see Barbour and 
Pfister 1995). Secondly, since “the velocity of a motion”, taken by itself, is 
meaningless, it must be replaced by a relative velocity, as was actually done in 
Leibniz’s treatment of collisions. And in this context, Leibniz introduced the 
distinction of total and partial living force (Section 8). This means that our nominal 
velocity v of the inertial motion is a dummy, and impetus mv also contains the same 
dummy. However, in the context of a collision (of two bodies with respective 
inertial motions), such dummies can be replaced by meaningful quantities in that 
context, depending on the center of common gravity. If we wish to treat collisions 
within a body, we have to change the context (corresponding to smaller bodies 
within that body), and this time, the center of gravity is of the single whole body, 
different from the previous one. 
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Thus, although Leibniz has never completed his dynamics, he has at least shown 
how to apply his dynamics to specific problems contained in a given context. And, to 
be fair, the same must be pointed out as regards Newton’s mechanics; he and his 
followers applied his mechanics by setting a certain context, extracted from the 
unknown whole, and were in no better position than Leibniz’s. In a similar way, 
Leibniz’s dynamics remained incomplete and unsystematic. But this is an inevitable 
consequence of Leibniz’s metaphysics. Because, obviously, Leibniz could not spell 
out the program of the monads; he merely suggested or sketched the recursive 
structure of that program, according to my interpretation. But his idea that a monad 
is a incorporeal automaton governed by a transition function is really amazing. 
Thus even the preceding sketch is a striking novelty, in spite of his “old-fashioned” 
terminology. Moreover, he could at least show a good vision for dynamics, because, 
for him, the major changes of motion are due to collisions. In other words, most of 
the interactions among phenomenal bodies are described in terms of collisions. 
And elastic collisions are repeated at every layer of the infinite divisibility of matter, 
from the level of planetary motions, action of gravity on the earth, centrifugal 
forces, collisions of billiard balls, deformation of a body, rebounding, etc., etc., ad 
infinitum. I suspect he might have considered the whole phenomenal universe as an 
elastic machine, so to speak, trying to explain gravity in terms of elasticity of ether, 
the ubiquitous matter filling the universe, together with other bodies.
So, here is another new discovery. In the preceding simple analysis, we can notice 
that the same recursive structure reappears! The program of an entelechy, as well as 
an organized collection of monads, has a recursive structure, as we have seen. And 
the same structure reappears in dynamics, which deals with motions in the 
phenomenal world. Thus, Leibniz’s claim that a partial correspondence or 
homomorphism holds between reality and phenomena, is at least partially justified.
Leibniz says that we should describe the motion within dynamics without 
appealing to metaphysical concepts. However, if we wish to explain why the laws 
of dynamics hold in the phenomenal world, we have to appeal to metaphysics. 
Why do active and passive derivative forces collaborate in such ways as described 
above? Leibniz’s general answer is: because the program of the body (of the 
preceding inertial motion) is enacted by the entelechy governing that body. All 
right, then, how does this program work? Thus we have go into some details of the 
program.
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For this purpose, let us introduce the notion of the “collective state” of a group of 
monads, and the “common force” of the same group. This group is the source of a 
body in the phenomenal world. And the collective state corresponds to an 
instantaneous place (with some extension) of the body in the phenomenal situation, 
relative to all other bodies (recall that Leibniz’s dynamics should be relational). The 
common force is nothing but the portion of the collective forces of the monads in the 
group, contributing to the change of the group taken as a whole. This is an adaptation 
of Leibniz’s distinction of living force between total and partial (further divided into 
proper and common), in Section 8. Notice that the “common resistance” (passive 
force) is already taken into consideration, since “force” includes two kinds, active 
and passive.
With this preparation, the transition function (the relevant portion, as far as this 
motion is concerned) of the governing entelechy prescribes, for an inertial motion, 
like this: 
(1) Common force, you strive for such-and-such change of the collective state; 
and continue the same change until a new instruction comes. 
Notice that this instruction is “translated” within the language describing 
phenomena; we do not know God’s coding, so that we cannot describe the program 
of a monad! However, we can at least point out that there must be, in the program 
of the dominant monad, a program corresponding to (1), written in God’s 
language. On this point, Leibniz’s explanation to Wolff (9 July 1711, Gerhardt 1860, 
138) is quite helpful; this explanation is translated in Adams (1993, 385) as follows:
You ask how the primitive force is modified, for instance, when the motion 
of heavy [bodies] is accelerated by falling. I reply that the modification of 
the primitive force that is in the Monad itself cannot be explained better 
than by expounding how the derivative force is changed in the phenomena.
Thus, my rendering such as (1) is not off the mark. Leibniz is saying that by 
analyzing dynamic change, we can approach an explanation of the modification of 
the monad’s force. And this is, according to my interpretation, nothing but an 
inference as regards how the monad’s program is going on.
The reader should keep in mind that the “change” in (1) corresponds (in the 
phenomena) not to change of velocity but to change of place; Leibniz’s (relational) 
definition of “place” is given in his 5th paper of the correspondence with Clarke 
(see Alexander 1956). That is, his dynamics must be understood within his own 
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framework of space and time; but unfortunately, his theories of dynamics and of 
space and time were incomplete.
Another remark we have to add is that the preceding instruction (program) must be 
understood as a “result” of a multitude of subprograms governing each part of the 
body; the entelechy of the body controls these subprograms and extract such a 
“result” as the preceding, by its interactions (i.e., action and passion) with the 
subprograms.
And further notice that this instruction is repeated at every moment, and in the 
monad in reality, the corresponding instruction (relevant part of its program or 
transition function) is repeated (not in time but it operates in succession). This is 
already a sort of recursion. And, here, we can clearly see that an important problem 
of coding is lurking. Non-quantitative successions of state in a monad must be 
transformed into quantitative and continuous successions in phenomena. In other 
words, how can Leibniz solve the problem of metric of time? The same problem 
appears for space (extension) too. Although I will postpone these questions until I 
begin to discuss Leibniz’s view on space and time, one thing is clear. The problem 
of metric in the phenomenal world is inseparable from God’s coding. Here is another 
crucial reason why we have to emphasize the mediation of coding. (Later, I will 
argue that this is the key for seeing the relevance of Leibniz’s dynamics to 
Einstein’s special relativity, which holds in inertial or Lorentzian systems. The 
Lorentz metric of relativity (in Minkowski space) can be reconstructed within 
Leibniz’s dynamics, provided that God’s coding is arranged appropriately.)
However, although this program for inertial motion is important, it is less 
important than the program for collision. For Leibniz’s dynamics, collisions are far 
more important as an interaction between bodies, reflecting the corresponding 
interaction (even though ideal) between programs and between monads. Therefore, 
collisions are the major part of the source for knowing the activities of monads. And 
I will argue that, since collisions occur at every stage (layer) of the infinite divisibility 
of matter, they recur infinitely, forever. Thus, this recursion nicely reflects the 
recursion in the program of a monad.
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15. Collisions and Programs
Let us turn to the problem of a collision anew. In view of the program for inertial 
motion (Section 14, (1)), how does the program for collision look like? Because of 
Leibniz’s view of collision (Section 6), we may concentrate on the program of one 
body. Although a collision does provide an occasion of the changes to follow, the 
process each body undergoes is governed by its own forces so that the program of 
this process can be described independently from (but connected with) the other’s 
program (this is an instance of the pre-established harmony). Its program may look 
like this:
(1) On a starting signal (beginning of a collision), begin deforming the 
whole body, until the relative velocity (viewed from the common center 
of gravity) becomes zero. Then, begin the process of recovery and 
rebound, until the elastic force is completely released. And continue the 
resulted inertial motion.
Again, this instruction is translated in the language for phenomena, and supported 
by innumerable subprograms of the parts of the body. And in spite of this 
limitation, (1) can give a good starting point for reconstructing the original 
programs of the corresponding group of monads. The crucial point is that this 
program (1) recurs again and again, at every layer of the structure within the body. 
This recursion must have a counterpart in the programs of monads, which are the 
real source of this body in the phenomena.
Moreover, for Leibniz, centrifugal force, gravity, etc. are all utilizing the same, or 
similar, program as (1), since any interaction between bodies (including such fluid 
as ether) must be an elastic collision. Such interactions in the phenomenal world is 
endless, but the reason why they are endless can be explained by his metaphysics, 
i.e., Monadology. The following chain is repeated again and again, at every layer of 
matter:
impetus (of the relative velocity of collision) → collision → deformation 
(impetus changing into dead force) → recovery from the deformation (dead 
force transformed into infinitesimal impetuses) → eventually leading to a 
new impetus of the whole body 
Corresponding to this chain, in the program of the entelechy governing a body, the 
dominant program acts on subprograms, and they are in turn acted on by it, and such 
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reciprocal relations recur again and again, in every lower layer of the subprogram. 
Thus, although Leibniz never used the word “recursion,” we can see that recursion 
is at the center of both of Leibniz’s dynamics and metaphysics. And if we grasp this, 
we should have a better understanding of his famous passage:
each simple substance is a perpetual, living mirror of the universe. 
(Monadology, section 56)
We now understand that the metaphor of “mirror” is Leibniz’s favorite way to 
express recursion: that a monad represents the whole universe, which contains that 
monad, and that the monad can, as a mirror, represent that all monads (including 
itself) can represent the universe, etc., etc., ad infinitum. Here, we can see an infinity 
of recursion. And because of the preceding correspondence (of recursion) between 
the reality and the phenomena, an anima can know something (at least) about the 
reality by examining phenomena. 
(To be continued, to Part 2)
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